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We consider a single period model where a monopolist introduces a product of uncertain quality. 
Before pricing and informative advertising decisions take place, the producer observes the true 
quality of the good while consumers receive an independent signal which is correlated with the 
true quality of the product. We show that if advertising occurs in equilibrium, there must exist 
some pooling. We then characterize the constellations of parameters for which advertising 
occurs in equilibrium: For an advertising full pooling equilibrium to exist, (a) the consumers' 
valuation for the high quality must be high enough, (b) the informativeness of the market signal 
must be sufficiently low, (c) the costs of advertising must be high enough and (d) the 
consumers' priori probability of high quality must be sufficiently high. Existence of an 
advertising semi-separating equilibrium also requires the three first conditions but, in contrast, 
the consumers' a priori probability of high quality cannot be too large. When advertising occurs 
in equilibrium, the adverse selection problem is mitigated. Moreover, the lower are advertising 
costs, the more intense is the alleviation of that problem. 
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1 Introduction 
In environments where the quality of the products is unobservable by consumers 
before they purchase the good (experience goods), a substantial amount of ad-
vertising is observed. l Even though it is not very clear whether the majority 
of advertising provides direct or indirect information about the quality of the 
products, the Industrial Organization literature has considered most of these 
advertising expenditures as directly uninformative. The underlying idea has for-
merly been proposed by Nelson (1974). In his seminal article, he suggests that 
advertising of experience goods cannot convey much direct information about 
their quality. He argues that, since experience qualities are unverifiable before 
their purchase, sellers' advertisements claiming that they are offering a higher 
quality product can be misleading and, thus, consumers will disregard them. As 
a result, he concludes that direct informative advertising of experience goods 
cannot abound. From his view, however, there are still reasons to observe unin-
formative advertising as it may indirectly be informative when there exist market 
mechanisms that positively relate product quality and advertising outlays. Nel-
son's ideas have more formally been developed by Milgrom and Roberts (1986) 
and Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984).2 
In a recent empirical research, however, Caves and Greene (1996) find that 
quality signaling is not the function of most of the advertising of consumption 
goods. In contrast, their findings are consistent with advertising that provides 
verifiable information which buyers learn when products have better features or 
capabilities. Following this view, we present an advertising model where the 
quality of the products is unobservable and where sellers can provide verifiable 
information about their qualities. One possible manner through which sellers can 
provide such an information is by distributing free samples of their products. This 
quality advertising mechanism has been overlooked by the literature on Industrial 
Organization. Marketing researchers define free samples as small portions of a 
newly introduced good that are made available to consumers with the purpose of 
1 Experience and search goods have formerly been defined by Nelson (1970, 1974). The 
quality of experience goods can only be ascertained after consumers purchase them while the 
quality of search goods is learned by consumers upon a simple observation of the products. 
2Milgrom and Roberts (1986) present a signaling model where the seller chooses both the 
price and the level of uninformative advertising at the time to introduce an unobservable quality 
product. In equilibrium, both variables may simultaneously be used as signals of quality, that 
is, consumers can infer the true quality of the product upon the observation of either the price 
charged and/or the volume of advertising. On the other hand, Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) 
offer an alternative explanation for introductory uninformative advertising expenditures. In 
their model advertising functions as an entry fee into the market for high quality products. 
Firms not investing in advertising are never considered to produce high qualities. 
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demonstrating the value of the product. Even though distributing free samples is 
the most expensive way to introduce a product, it has been shown to be the most 
effective manner when sellers are very reliable on their products' characteristics. 3 
Nevertheless, our model also allows for different advertising mechanisms that 
provide verifiable information on products' quality such as point-oJ-sale or point-
oJ-purchase demonstrations. 
We develop an adverse selection model where a monopolist introduces a good 
whose unobservable quality can be either high or low. Before making any price 
or advertising decision, the producer observes the true quality of the product and 
all consumers receive an independent market signal which is positively correlated 
with the true quality.4 Then the seller simultaneously sets the price and the in-
formative advertising intensity. Naturally, advertising is costly for the producer. 
It is assumed that all buyers observe the price charged but, in contrast, the ad-
vertising effort is not observable. An individual consumer only observes whether 
he has received a free sample or not. Hence, only prices may function as signals 
of quality in our model. Consumers are fully rational: those consumers who re-
ceive an advertisement ascertain the true quality of the product and disregard 
any other signal received while the rest of consumers decide to buy or not taking 
into consideration the price, the signal observed and also the fact that they have 
not received a free sample. 
Vve first show that if informative advertising occurs in equilibrium, there must 
exist some pooling. Indeed, in any separating equilibrium, advertising cannot 
exist. As it is well known, in a separating equilibrium prices signal quality.5 In 
such a case, after observing the price, consumers perfectly learn the true quality 
of the product and, therefore, advertising expenditures are completely unnece-
ssary. This is in contrast with models where uninformative advertising functions 
as a quality signal: Milgrom and Roberts (1986) show that uninformative ad-
vertising may contribute to the signaling role of prices to achieve separation at 
minimal cost. In Kihlstrom and Riordan (1984) uninformative advertising is 
the only manner to signal qualities because firms do not choose their prices. In 
these models, uninformative advertising expenditures may signal the quality of 
the products because all consumers observe the amount of advertising expendi-
tures. Contrarily, in our model, some consumers become fully informed about 
the quality of the product after receiving the informative advertising but unin-
3Free samples are widely used to introduce beauty aids, cookies, cleaning products, etc. For 
instance, Lever Brothers successfully introduced its new Surf detergent by sending out more 
than 4 million free samples (see Kotler (1994». 
4Wolinsky (1983) introduces a similar market signal in his work on prices as signals of 
qualities. He argues that consumers obtain imperfect but costlessly information about qualities 
as a by-product of their shopping process. 
5See Milgrom and Roberts (1986) and Bagwell and Riordan (1991) for models where quality 
is exogenously given. In Chan and Leland (1982), Wolinsky (1983), Rusell and Ross (1984, 
1985) and Riordan (1986) prices signal quality choices. 
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formed consumers are unable to observe whether a firm advertises or not. Thus, 
informative advertising cannot function as a signal of quality.6 
Secondly, we investigate the constellations of parameters for which advertising 
appears in both full pooling equilibria and partial pooling (or semi-separating) 
equilibria. It is shown that if the difference between the high and the low qua-
lity is not sufficiently large, informative advertising never occurs in any pooling 
equilibrium. Further, for an advertising full pooling equilibrium to exist, (a) the 
informativeness of the market signal must be low enough, (b) the consumers' 
prior probability of high quality must be sufficiently high and (c) the costs of 
advertising must be high enough. Existence of an advertising partial pooling 
equilibrium also requires (a) and (c) but, in contrast, the consumers' prior pro-
bability of high quality can not be too large. Interestingly, for some parameter 
constellations, partial and full pooling equilibria coexist. When parameters are 
such that a semi-separating equilibrium where the low quality seller charges a 
pooling price with sufficiently high probability exists, then, a higher price accom-
panied by higher advertising expenditures can also be sustained as a full pooling 
equilibrium. When the informativeness of the market signal decreases, the set of 
parameters for which both equilibria coexist vanishes. 
It is finally worth noting that in our model some consumers become perfectly 
informed in a pooling equilibrium. The source of their information is advertising. 
This is also in contrast to those papers on uninformative advertising as a signal of 
quality, where consumers are only perfectly informed in a separating equilibrium 
(or exogeneously). Consumers may here learn the true quality from either the 
price (in a separating equilibrium) or from advertising (in a pooling equilibrium).7 
Interestingly, the quantity traded when advertising occurs in any type of pooling 
equilibrium is higher than when advertising is forbidden. As a result, informative 
advertising is here found to mitigate the adverse selection problem. Further, the 
lower are the advertising costs, the alleviation of that problem is more intense.8 
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 presents the model. 
Separating equilibria are analyzed in section 3. In section 4, we investigate full 
pooling equilibria with and without advertising. Partial pooling equilibria are 
studied in section 5. Finally, section 6 concludes. Some of the proofs have been 
relegated to an appendix. 
6 A similar insight can be found in Hertzendorf's (1993) paper, which extends Milgrom 
and Roberts's by introducing noisy advertising. When consumers cannot perfectly observe a 
firm's uninformative advertising expenditure, advertising cannot serve as a signal of quality any 
more. Then, signaling is an exclusive role of prices and, as a result, an advertising separating 
equilibrium does not exist. 
7In regard to this, Vettas (1996) develops a similar model where consumers can also learn the 
true quality of the product from two alternative sources: from the price (if there is separation) 
and from word-of-mouth communication (if there is separation and/or pooling). 
8Typically, in adverse selection models the quantity traded tends to be small (see e.g. Akerlof 
(1970)). 
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2 The model. 
Consider a single period monopoly market where a new product of uncertain 
quality q is introduced. At the beginning of the trading period, only the producer 
observes the true quality of the product. 9 For simplicity, there are only two 
qualities of the good: high quality, qh, and low quality, ql. In what follows, the 
monopolist when the quality is low (high) will be referred to as the low (high) 
quality seller. The cost of producing one unit of the high quality good is c > 0 
while the unitary cost oflow quality is normalized to zero. Further, it is assumed 
that (a) qh - C > ql and (b) ql - C > o. Assumption (a) means that producing the 
high quality good is socially more efficient. On the other hand, if assumption (b) 
were not satisfied, then the high quality seller would never mimic his low quality 
counterpart. 
There is a large number of potential consumers whose mass is normalized to 
unity and each of whom will at most purchase one unit of the product. All buyers 
have identical reservation values for the products, which are qh for the high quality 
and ql for the low quality good. Prior to purchase and before the seller sets his 
marketing strategy (price and advertising intensity), none of the consumers is 
informed about the true quality of the product. Consumers' common prior belief 
for a high quality product is denoted by f3 and is common knowledge. 
Before any pricing or advertising decision takes place, the producer observes 
the true quality of the product and all consumers receive an independent signal 
s about the actual quality. The signal can be either a signal of high (Sh) or low 
(Sl) quality and is such that: 
(1) 
We assume that 'Y > 0.5 which implies that the signal s is positively correlated 
with the true quality. That is, if quality is actually high, the probability of 
receiving a signal of high quality is higher than the probability of receiving a 
signal of low quality. If quality is low then it is more likely to receive a signal 
of low quality than a signal of high quality. On the other hand, we assume that 
there is enough noise in the market so that the signal is not perfectly correlated 
with quality, that is 'Y < 1. One possible interpretation is that buyers read a 
number of different consumers reports or newspapers which announce that the 
product will be introduced into the market and that, on average, a fraction 'Y of 
them reports the expected quality of the product correctly. Thus, a fraction 'Y of 
the population would receive a correct signal about the actual quality while the 
rest of the buyers would receive wrong information. ID 
9In game theory, this is the typical Nature's movement. By assuming this, we are replacing 
the "incomplete" information game by a game of "complete" but "imperfect" information (see 
Harsanyi (1967, 1968)). The problem is thus modelled as one of adverse selection instead of 
moral hazard. 
10 A similar assumption is found in Wolinsky (1983). He argues that consumers prepurchase 
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The (high quality) seller can provide perfect information about the true qua-
lity through advertising activities. ll Each consumer is equally likely to receive 
an advertisement (free sample) of the product through which he is able to ascer-
tain its actual quality. Advertising is costly. For simplicity and computational 
convenience, we assume that costs of informing a fraction A of the consumers 
are quadratic, '~.t. C(A) = O.5kA2 , k > o. According to this specifica.tion, in-
forming a larger fraction of buyers is more costly and, further, the advertising 
technology exhibits decreasing returns to scale. These features are standard in 
the literature on informative advertising. 12 F\lrther, it is implicitly assumed that 
advertising costs do not depend on the quality advertised. This is reasonable since 
the low quality seller will never advertise in equilibrium. Furthermore, neither 
the total amount of money spent on advertising nor the advertising intensity are 
observable by consumers. Finally, to ensure that the seller's optimal advertising 
effort is always an interior solution to the corresponding problem, we assume that 
k > qh - c. 
Consumers and firm objectives are assumed to be as follows: consumers, 
basing their decisions on their quality expectations qe, maximize their net surplus. 
On the other hand, the monopolist, taking as given consumers expectations, 
maximizes profits. Finally, we assume that all features of the model are common 
knowledge. 
If information were complete, in equilibrium the low quality seller would 
charge pi = ql and make profits of ili = ql, while the high quality seller would set 
Ph = qh and obtain profits of ilh = qh - c. In what follows, we will refer to these 
prices and profits as the optimal prices and profits under complete information. 
As qh -c > ql (see above) the high quality product is socially more efficient. Thus, 
under complete information, if the producer were able to choose the quality of 
the product he would select the high quality. 
Under incomplete information, our model defines a signaling game. This 
game is however non-standard as the marketing strategy of the seller has two 
components: the price which is observable and the advertising effort which is 
not observable. Since those consumers not receiving a free sample (uninformed 
consumers) do not observe whether the seller advertises or not, it is only the 
price that may signal quality. As usual, we focus on separating, pooling and 
observation discloses some information about the quality of the products. He assumes that in 
the course of a visit to a firm, a consumer gets a signal which depends on the true quality and 
also on random factors. He assumes however that there is a positive probability that the signal 
fully reveals the true quality of the product. We rule out this possibility by assuming 'Y < 1. 
11 It is obvious that only the high quality seller will have an incentive to spend resources in 
advertising. 
12See e.g. Butters (1977) and Grossman and Shapiro (1984). The underlying idea is that 
an advertisement may fail to reach an uninformed buyer. For instance, if the high quality 
seller distributes a number m of free samples by inserting them in a number of newspapers or 
magazines, it is reasonable to think that less than m consumers will become fully informed (as 
some consumers can at a time buy more than one of these media). 
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partial pooling (or semi-separating) equilibria. In a separating equilibrium, the 
high and the low quality sellers choose different prices and, consumers, after 
observing the price, ascertain the true quality of the product. In contrast, in 
a full pooling equilibrium, both firms set the same price and consumers cannot 
ascertain the true quality using only this observation. This feature also appears 
in a partial pooling equilibrium where the high quality seller always sets the 
pooling price and the low quality seller randomizes between the pooling price and 
the optimal price that he would have set under complete information. I3 Since 
our focus is on advertising we will also distinguish between advertising and non-
advertising equilibria. Here, as it is typical in signaling models, a large number of 
equilibria may arise. There may exist a large number of separating, pooling and 
partial pooling with or without advertising. The source of this multiplicity is the 
indeterminacy of the out-of-equilibrium consumers' beliefs. To restrict the class 
of equilibria we will use the intuitive criterion. Intuitively, a proposed equilibrium 
is intuitive if there does not exist another price, for which the high quality seller 
is better off while the low quality seller is worse off, when both are considered 
to sell the high quality product. If this price existed, consumers should correctly 
infer that only a high quality firm would charge such a price, which makes the 
high quality seller to profitably deviate by charging this price, and, as a result, 
the proposed equilibrium to fail. I4 
3 Separating equilibrium. 
In a separating equilibrium the high quality and the low quality seller charge di-
fferent prices. Thus, the price signals the true quality of the product. Let (pi, Ph) 
be a separating equilibrium. Then consumers, after observing price pi (Ph) ascer-
tain that the quality is low (high). In other words, consumers, after observing the 
price charged, disregard any received market signal s and infer the true quality of 
the product. This characteristic of the separating equilibria allow us to conclude 
that advertising never occurs in such a class of equilibria. The intuition simply 
stems from the mere fact that prices signal quality: since all potential consumers 
would actually purchase the product in equilibrium, advertising the high quality 
product would only generate additional costs for the seller. Thus: 
Proposition 1 Informative advertising never occurs in a separating equilibrium. 
Note, further, that in a separating equilibrium both sellers' demands are the 
same as in the full information case, that is: 
{
I if P ::; qi . 
Di(P) = 0 th . ; 't = h, l. o erWlse (2) 
13 As we explain below, a partial pooling equilibrium where the high quality seller randomizes 
does not exist. 
14 For a formal definition see Cho and Kreps (1987). 
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The fact that both sellers would serve the entire market in any separating 
equilibrium leads us to conclude that such type of equilibrium cannot exist in 
our model. This is due to the fact that all consumers have the same product 
valuations. Thus, if one consumer buys the high quality product in equilibrium, 
all of them will also buy it and, therefore, the low quality seller would always have 
an incentive to mimic his high quality counterpart. The so-called "single-c:rossing 
property" is not verified here since sending higher messages (here prices) is not 
easier for the high quality seller. The next proposition summarizes. I5 
Proposition 2 A separating equilibrium does not exist in our model. 
4 Pooling equilibrium. 
In a pooling equilibrium, both the high and the low quality seller set the same 
price and consumers are unable to ascertain the true quality using only this 
observation. Further, consumers expect to receive a free sample from the high 
quality seller with some positive probability. Let Ae be the common probability 
with which consumers expect to be reached by an advertisement of the high 
quality good. While those consumers receiving a free sample learn the true quality 
of the product and disregard any signal observed, the rest of them will use all 
the available information to update their beliefs on quality. Thus, conditional 
upon observing the price p and a high quality signal Sh, the expected quality of 
consumers not receiving an advertisement is (by B ayes , rule):I6 
(3) 
If, on the other hand, consumers observe a low quality signal SI, they expect the 
quality to be: 
15It is important to note that the non-existence of informative advertising in a separating 
equilibrium is not model specific at all and it is clearly in contrast to those models of uninfor-
mative advertising as a signal of quality. 
In contrast, the non-existence of separating equilibria is specific to our model. It stems 
from the fact that all consumers valuations are identical. In fact, the only manner in which 
consumers valuations differ in our model is through the market signal s. However, in a separating 
equilibrium consumers disregard such an information. Bagwell and Riordan (1991) obtain 
separation by considering that consumers' willingness to pay for the high quality are different 
across them. Assuming this in our model would substantially complicate the rest of the analysis, 
without adding much to it since our focus is on informative advertising. 
16Here, the probability of receiving a free sample depends on whether the producer is the 
high or the low quality seller. Thus, consumers who have not received information will use 
this fact to update their beliefs on quality by Baye's rule. This is similar to Vettas (1996), 
where the probability of being informed through word-of-mouth communication also depends 
on whether the firm is the high or the low type. Thus, those consumers not informed through 
other consumers update their beliefs taking into account this fact. 
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(4) 
Therefore, for any price p, the sellers demand Di(p, A, Ae) depends on the price 
(p), the advertising intensity (A) and the consumers expected advertising inten-
sity of the high quality seller (Ae). Sellers maximize profits IIi(p, A, Ae) taking 
the expectation Ae as fixed. Of course, in equilibrium we will require Ae to be 
consistent with the actual advertising intensity chosen by the high quality seller 
(rational expectations hypothesis). 
We first derive both sellers demand functions. If the product is actually the 
low quality one, a fraction "/ of the population observes the right signal SI. These 
consumers will buy the product as long as p ~ qel(Ae). The rest of consumers, a 
fraction 1 - ,,/, observes the wrong signal Sh and will then purchase the product 
whenever p ~ qeh(Ae). Obviously, the low quality seller will not advertise his 
product at all. Thus, the demand for the low quality product is: 
(5) 
Analogously, consider that the actual quality is high. Then, a fraction "/ of the 
consumers receives signal Sh while a fraction 1-,,/ observes signal SI. Disregarding, 
for the moment, the possibility to advertise his product, the high quality seller 
would serve the entire market for those prices such that p ~ qel(Ae) and, for 
those in the interval qel(Ae) < P ~ qeh(Ae) would obtain a demand of "/. However, 
the high quality seller can increase his demand by advertising the product as all 
consumers receiving an advertisement will learn its true quality and thus, will 
buy the good as long as p ~ qh. Hence, the high quality seller faces the following 
demand function: 
(6) 
Given this demand function we can easily compute the high quality seller's 
optimal advertising effort. If p ~ qel(Ae), the high quality seller serves the entire 
market because both types of consumers, those receiving the right signal and 
those observing the wrong one, purchase the product. Therefore, advertising the 
product would only generate extra costs for the seller. On the other hand, if 
qel(Ae) < P ~ qeh(Ae), none of the consumers observing the wrong signal would 
purchase unless they receive a free sample. For this interval of prices, the high 
quality seller chooses A E [0,1] to maximize his profits IIh(p, A, Ae) = b + A(1 -
,,/))(p - c) - 0.5kA2. From the first order condition it is obtained that A* = (1 -
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,)(p - c)/k (which also satisfies the second order condition). Finally, if qeh(Ae) < 
p::; qh, consumers would not purchase the good unless they ascertain the actual 
quality. In this case, the monopolist maximizes the function IIh(p, A, Ae) = A(p-
c) - O.5kA2. From the first (and second) order condition it follows that A* = (p-
c)/k. Let us emphasize that the assumption k > qh - C assures that the optimal 
advertising effort is always an interior solution of the corresponding problem. 
Summarizing, the high quality seller optimal advertising policy is given by the 
following lemma: 
Lemma 1 In any pooling equilibrium, given the price p and the expected adver-
tising effort Ae , the high quality seller optimal advertising strategy is given by: 
{ 
(1-1'1(P-c) if qel(Ae) < P ::; qeh(Ae) 
A * (p, Ae) = (p~c) if qeh (Ae) < p ::; qh 
o otherwise 
(7) 
To illustrate, Figure 1 depicts both sellers' demands. The stepwise function 
represented by the solid line depicts the low quality seller's demand. The discon-
tinuous schedule represented by the dashed line shows the high quality seller's 
demand. Observe that there are two flat intervals in the demand for the high 
quality seller. These correspond to those prices for which the optimal advertising 
effort is zero. Interestingly, there are also two upward sloping intervals which 
stem from the fact that the optimal advertising effort is an increasing function of 
the price within each interval (see lemma 1). The higher is the price, the higher 
is the surplus the monopolist gets from each unit of good sold and, therefore, the 
higher are his incentives to advertise. 
<insert Figure 1 here> 
At this point, it is also worth noting that, since marginal costs of informing 
a small fraction of consumers are arbitrarily low, the high quality seller will al-
ways increase his demand by sending out a small amount of free samples (as 
long as he does not serve the entire market). From this observation, it turns 
out that two possible types of equilibria may arise: those where advertising does 
not occur, which we call non-advertising pooling equilibria and those where ad-
vertising occurs, which we call advertising pooling equilibria. Naturally, in a 
non-advertising equilibrium both firms will serve the entire market. 
In analyzing whether a proposed equilibrium is indeed an equilibrium or not, 
we have to check for possible profitable deviations. Unfortunately, B ayes , rule 
does not pin down determinate beliefs off-the-equilibrium path. This means that 
when a firm deviates from a proposed equilibrium by charging a different price 
(i.e. sending a disequilibrium "message"), consumers may in general infer any 
possible expected quality after observing such an out-of-equilibrium price. A 
proposed equilibrium is then easiestly supported as an equilibrium by assuming 
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that the beliefs formed by consumers after observing a firm deviation are the 
worst possible, that is, a deviating firm will always be considered to sell the low 
quality productP To analyze the equilibria, we then need to characterize both 
sellers' deviation strategies and their profits thereafter. Let p* be a proposed 
equilibrium. At, worst, when a seller deviates from p* by charging p, he will 
be believed to produce low quality with probability 1. Consider first that the 
deviator is the low quality seller. When he deviates by charging p, he serves the 
entire market as long as p ::; q[. Otherwise, he obtains zero demand. Suppose now 
that the deviator is the high quality seller. He has always the option to advertise 
his product and, to some extent, diminish the negative effects derived from being 
considered to produce the low quality with certainty. Of course, he advertises at 
a level determined by lemma 1. Therefore, he serves the entire market whenever 
p::; q[ and faces demand of (p-c)/k as long as q[ < p::; qh. Otherwise, his demand 
is zero. We depict these demands in Figure 2. Again, the demand for the low 
quality good is represented by the solid line while the dashed line represents the 
high quality seller's demand. There is an upward sloping interval in the high 
quality seller's demand function. This is due to the fact that for prices such that 
q[ < P ::; qh, his optimal advertising effort is an increasing function of the price. 
<insert Figure 2 here> 
As a result, when consumers believe that quality is certainly low, the best 
deviating price for the low quality seller is p = q[. His best deviating profits 
would then be IT[ = q[. Analogously, the high quality seller has two alternative 
best deviating strategies, namely, either (a) to charge p = q[ and not advertise at 
all which would yield profits of ITh = q[ - C or (b) to charge p = qh and advertise 
at level X = (qh - c)/k which would yield profits of ITh = (qh - C)2 /2k. We will use 
these best deviating strategies and profits to characterize the pooling equilibria. 
4.1 Non-advertising pooling equilibria. 
In any non-advertising equilibria both sellers must serve the entire market. The 
reason is that informing a small fraction of consumers about his true quality is 
arbitrarily cheap for the seller; thus, as long as the high quality seller does not 
serve all the consumers, he will always spend some resources in advertising. The 
following lemma establishes the set of relevant prices of a non-advertising pooling 
equilibrium. 
Lemma 2 In any non-advertising pooling equilibrium ql ::; P ::; qel(Ae). 
Proof. Suppose not, then there are three possibilities. First, if p < q[, the 
low quality seller would deviate because his profits are strictly increasing for any 
17Later we will use the well known intuitive criterion to restrict the set of possible beliefs. 
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beliefs in this interval. Second, if qel(Ae) < p :S qeh(Ae), the high quality seller 
would deviate by advertising the product as arg max {(, + (1 - ,)A)(p - c) -
A 
0.5kA2} > O. Finally, if p > qeh(Ae), the low quality seller would face zero demand 
and would then have an incentive to deviate to ql .• 
For (p*, A *) being a non-advertising equilibrium, in addition, it must be the 
case that neither the high nor the low quality seller has an incentive to deviate 
and moreover that A* = Ae = o. A seller has no incentives to deviate from the 
proposed equilibrium (p*, A *) as long as he makes higher profits from adopting 
this strategy than from using his best deviating one. Thus, for the low quality 
seller one must have that p* ~ ql and for the high quality seller it must be true 
that (p* - c) ~ max{ ql - C, (qh - C)2 /2k}. The following proposition characterizes 
the non-advertising equilibria. 
Proposition 3 (p*, A*) is a non-advertising pooling equilibrium if and only if: 
(a)p* ~ql 
(b) p* :S qel(Ae) 
(e) p* ~ (%2~c)2 + e 
(d) A* = Ae = O. 
So far non-advertising pooling equilibria have been characterized. Vve next 
turn to their existence. We define: 
(8) 
Proposition 4 A non-advertising pooling equilibrium exists if and only if k ~ 
\[11 ({3, ,). 
Proof. (=» Assume (p*, 0) is a non-advertising pooling equilibrium. Then, by 
(b) and (c), p* - e ~ (qh - e)2/2k and qel(O) - p* ~ o. By adding these two 
inequalities, it is obtained that qel(O) - e ~ (qh - e)2/2k. Then, by substituting 
equation (4) into qel(O) and isolating k, we have k ~ \[11 ({3, ,). 
(~) We show that (p,A) = (qel(O), 0) is a non-advertising equilibrium. First, 
lemma 1 ensures that optimal advertising when p = qel(Ae) is zero for any Ae. 
The low quality seller does not deviate as qel(O) ~ ql. Moreover, the high quality 
seller does not deviate as long as qel - C ~ (qh - c)2/2k, which is ensured by the 
condition that k ;:::: \[11 ({3, ,) .• 
The intuition is clear. In a non-advertising pooling equilibrium, the low qua-
lity seller mimics his high quality counterpart. The mere fact that consumers are 
uninformed about the products' quality allows the low quality seller to charge 
prices above his full information optimal price (ql) without loosing buyers, and as 
a result, he makes higher profits. Further, for any price in the relevant range, the 
low quality seller does not deviate from it as he already serves the entire market. 
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The fact that all consumers buy at the proposed price also implies, first, that the 
high quality seller's optimal advertising effort is zero (as there are no gains from 
informing consumers) and second, that the high quality seller has not incentives 
to deviate by lowering his price. Finally, for this to be an equilibrium it is nece-
ssary that the costs of advertising are sufficiently high. If k were very small, the 
high quality seller would deviate by charging his full information optimal price 
disregarding the fact that his product would considered of low quality with pro-
bability 1, as he would be able to profitably inform most of the consumers about 
the true quality at a low cost. If k is high enough, such a deviation is no longer 
profitable, which is ensured by the condition that k 2: Wl(,8,,). 
<insert figures 3.1 and 3.2 here> 
The set of parameters for which a non-advertising pooling equilibrium exists is 
clearly non-empty. In figures 3.1 and 3.2, we have depicted the function Wl(,8,,) 
in the k - ,8 and k - , spaces. As we have seen, in a non-advertising pooling 
equilibrium all consumers buy. This means that the price cannot be higher than 
the expected quality of those consumers receiving a low quality signal (qe/(O)). 
As the consumers' prior probability of high quality (,8) decreases, to sustain such 
an equilibrium, it is necessary that the costs of advertising increase. The reason 
is that as,8 decreases, the expected quality qel(O) approaches q/, and, as a result, 
the price charged in equilibrium is lower. The high quality seller's incentives to 
deviate to the strategy (qh, A*(qh)) are then higher because his equilibrium profits 
decrease. The contrary happens when the informativeness of the market signal 
h) diminishes. The price charged in equilibrium increases as , decreases and, 
therefore, the equilibrium is easier to sustain. 
Finally, notice that any non-advertising equilibrium is intuitive. In fact, 
assume that p* is a non-advertising equilibrium. By definition, it satisfies the 
intuitive criterion if it does not exist another price p such that (a) p - c > p* - c 
and (b) P < p* are verified. Clearly, such a price can never exist. 
4.2 Advertising pooling equilibria. 
We now turn to study advertising pooling equilibria. In an advertising pooling 
equilibrium, the price must be high enough so that some consumers do not pur-
chase the product and the high quality seller has an incentive to inform some of 
them about the true quality. In other words, there must be some consumers that 
would not buy the high quality product unless they were informed of the true 
quality. This actually happens for those prices such that qel(Ae) < p* ~ qeh(Ae) as 
only those consumers receiving a high quality signal purchase the product (Figure 
1). Note also that a price higher than qeh(Ae) cannot be an equilibrium because in 
that case the low quality seller has zero demand. The following lemma states the 
set of prices which may plausibly constitute an advertising pooling equilibrium. 
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Lemma 3 In any advertising pooling equilibrium. qel(Ae) < p* :::; qeh(t}e). 
For (p*, A *) being an advertising pooling equilibrium, additionally, the adver-
tising effort has to be optimal, that is, A* must be equal to arg max IIh(p*, A, Ae). 
>. 
From lemma 1, then A* = (1 -,)(p* - c)/k. It is also necessary that neither the 
high nor the low quality seller has an incentive to deviate and, finaily, that the 
consumers' expected advertising intensity of the high quality seller coincides with 
the actual one. The high quality seller does not deviate from the proposed equili-
brium as long as his equilibrium profits, given by (p* -c)(f+A*(1-,)) -O.5kA*2, 
exceed his profits from his best deviating strategy, that is, exceed max{ ql-C, (qh-
c)2/2k}. Analogously, the low quality seller does not deviate if (1 -,)p* 2:: ql. 
The following proposition characterizes the advertising pooling equilibria: 
Proposition 5 (p*, A *) is an advertising pooling equilibrium if and only if: 
(a) A* = Ae = (l--y)£P*-c) 
(b) qel(Ae) < p* :::; qeh(Ae) 
(c) (1 -,)p* 2:: ql 
(d) ,(p* - c) + (1--y)22~*-c)2 2:: max {ql - c, (qh;c)2} 
To establish existence of an advertising pooling equilibrium we define: 
A = ,fJ(1-,) 
B = A(qh + c) + k(,fJ + (1 - fJ)(1 -I)) 
C = AqhC + k(ffJqh + (1 - fJ)(1 -,)qt) 
2 1 x- - B-(B -4AC)~ 
- 2A 
The following proposition, whose proof is tedious and is thus relegated to the 
appendix, establishes existence of an advertising pooling equilibrium. 
Proposition 6 An advertising pooling equilibrium exists if and only if: 
(a') qh > 2ql 
(b ') , < 9.h.::!J1. 
% 
(c'l fJ > k(l--y)ql J - (%(l--y)-qIl(k-(ql-(l--y)c))+k(l--y)ql 
(d') 2k,(X- - c) + (1 _,)2(X- - C)2 - (qh - C)2 2:: 0 
The intuition behind these conditions is as follows. Consider first the low 
quality seller. In comparison to his best deviating strategy, in an advertising 
pooling equilibrium, he charges a higher price (p* > ql) but sells a lower quantity 
(1 -, < 1). To ensure that the low quality seller does not deviate neither 
his sales nor his price can be too low. This is assured by conditions (a')-(c'). 
On the one hand, (a') and (c') ensure that the price charged is not too low. 
Condition (a') means that the consumers' reservation value for the high quality 
must be sufficiently larger than their reservation price for the low quality. This 
is necessary for the buyers' expected qualities to be sufficiently higher than their 
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reservation values for the low quality. This is not enough however. Condition 
(c') has also to be satisfied. That is, the consumers' prior probability of high 
quality must also be sufficiently large because otherwise the price charged would 
be too low. Note that the higher is the prior for the high quality, the higher are 
consumers' expected qualities and, as a result, consumers' willingness to pay for 
the products. When either (3 or qh is too low, the pooling price is very close to 
ql and, as a result, this price cannot be sustained in equilibrium any more. On 
the other hand, condition (b') assures that equilibrium sales are not too low. It 
requires that the market is noisy enough (-y small). In fact, in equilibrium, the 
low quality seller only sells to those consumers who have received the wrong signal 
(fraction 1 -1'), that is, the high quality signal, as those consumers receiving the 
low quality signal do not buy in a pooling equilibrium. Therefore, the fraction of 
incorrectly informed consumers through the signal has to be large enough for an 
equilibrium to exist. Note that condition (a') also assures that the set of l' for 
which an equilibrium exists is nonempty. 
Consider now the high quality seller. The above arguments also allow us to 
rule out a deviation where the high quality seller lowers his price. If the low 
quality seller has no incentive to deviate to the price ql, then the high quality 
seller has no incentive to deviate to the strategy (q!, 0) either. The intuition is 
simply that even if he disregards the possibility of advertising his product, the 
high quality seller is better off by charging the pooling price. Finally, to ensure 
that the high quality seller does not deviate by raising his price, condition (d') 
must be satisfied. This condition requires the cost of advertising to be sufficiently 
high. If, contrarily, this cost were relatively small, it would always be profitable 
for the high quality seller to deviate by charging the consumers' reservation price 
for the high quality and, extensively advertising the product at a low cost. This 
would also impede the existence of an advertising pooling equilibrium. 
To summarize, for an advertising pooling equilibrium to exist, it is necessary 
that (a) the reservation price for the high quality is large enough in comparison to 
the low quality one, (b) the informativeness of the signal is sufficiently imperfect, 
(c) the consumers' prior probability of high quality is large enough and, finally, 
(d) costs of advertising is sufficiently high. 
<insert Figure 4 here> 
The set of parameters for which an advertising pooling equilibrium exists 
is non-empty. In Figure 4 we have depicted the conditions for its existence. 
The schedule C-C depicts condition (c') while D-D depicts condition (d'). The 
lower bound (3 has been obtained from condition (c'). Of course, the rest of 
parameters have been chosen to satisfy conditions (a') and (b'). The shaded 
area then represents the constellation of parameters k - (3 for which informative 
advertiSing occurs in a full pooling equilibrium. It is interesting to note that as 
the consumers' prior probability of high quality ((3) decreases, a higher advertising 
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cost is required to sustain the equilibrium. The intuition is again that the price 
charged decreases as f3 diminishes because the consumers' willingness to pay 
decreases. So, from both sellers point of view, a higher parameter k is required 
to support the equilibrium (both schedules C-C and D-D decrease with k). 
Finally, it is important to note that any advertising pooling equilibria satisfy 
the intuitive criterion. In fact, assume that (p*, A *) is an advertising pooling 
equilibrium. It satisfies the intuitive criterion if there does not exist another 
price p for which conditions (a) p - c > ,(p* - c) + (1 - ,)2(p* - c)2/2k and (b) 
p < (1 - ,)p* are satisfied. In other words, (p*,A*) is an intuitive advertising 
pooling equilibrium as long as ,(p* - c) + (1 - ,)2(p* - c)2/2k + c ;::: (1 - ,)p*. 
Rearranging this, we obtain that it must be the case that (1 - ,)2(p* - C)2 /2k ~ 
p*(1 - 2,) - c(1 - ,). This is always satisfied because, >0.5. 
5 Partial pooling equilibrium. 
In a partial pooling (or semi-separating) equilibrium, the low quality seller ran-
domizes between his optimal perfect information price ql, and a pooling price 
p*, while the high quality seller always sets the pooling price.18 Let Pe denote 
the consumers' expectation on the low quality seller's probability of charging the 
pooling price. In a partial pooling equilibrium, the information in the market is 
as follows: Consumers observing price ql ascertain that the quality is low. Buyers 
receiving a free sample from the high quality seller learn that the true quality is 
high. Finally, those consumers observing the price p* and a high quality signal 
Sh and not receiving an advertisement expect quality to be: 
- (A ) _ ,f3(1 - Ae)qh + (1 - ,)(1 - f3)Peql 
qeh e, Pe - ,f3(1 - Ae) + (1 - ,)(1 - f3)Pe (9) 
while those buyers receiving a low quality signal SI form beliefs: 
(10) 
The same type of arguments as in the previous section allow us to find both 
sellers' demand functions: 19 
(11) 
ISIt can be easily seen that there is no partial pooling equilibrium where the high quality 
seller randomizes. 
I9We do not to depict these demands. In fact, they are the same as the demands for the full 
pooling equilibrium case with a minor difference: qel().e) and qeh().e) must be qel().e,Pe) and 
qeh().e, Pe) respectively. 
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(12) 
Here, we also distinguish between non-advertising partial pooling equilibria and 
advertising partial pooling equilibria. By a simple observation of the low quality 
product demand, we infer that in any advertising partial pooling equilibrium, the 
pooling price must lie in the interval iJel(Ae, Pe) < p* :S iJeh(Ae, Pe). Otherwise, the 
low quality seller would never randomize as profits from the pooling price would 
be either higher or lower than profits from charging ql. From this fact and since 
informing a small percentage of consumers is arbitrarily cheap for the seller, it 
follows that advertising always occurs in any semi-separating equilibrium. These 
observations are summarized in the following lemma. 
Lemma 4 (a) In any partial pooling equilibrium iJel(Ae, Pe) < p* :S iJeh(Ae, Pe). 
(b) A non-advertising partial pooling equilibrium never exists. 
Now, we characterize advertising partial pooling equilibria. Let (p*, A *, p*) 
be a proposed equilibrium. For the low quality seller to randomize, p* must 
be equal to qL/(l - ')'). The reason is that the low quality seller must obtain 
the same profits by charging the pooling price p* or by setting ql. His profits 
from charging ql are equal to ql, while by setting the pooling price p* he makes 
profits of (1 - ')')p*. Thus, p* = qL/(l - ')'). Further, this is the unique price 
which can be supported in a partial pooling equilibrium. At this price, the high 
quality seller's optimal advertising effort is given by lemma 1 and is equal to 
A* = ql - (1 - ,),)c/k. F\lrthermore, the high quality seller must obtain higher 
profits from following the equilibrium strategy than from deviating from it, that 
is, ')'(qL/(l-')') - c) + (ql - (1-')')c)2 /2k ~ max {ql - C, (qh - C)2 /2k} . Finally, in 
equilibrium consumers expectations must be correct. The following proposition 
summarizes the characterization of semi-separating equilibria. 
Proposition 7 (p*, A * , p*) is an advertising partial pooling equilibrium if and 
only if: 
( .) * --.!J.L ~ P = (1-1') 
( ' ') \ * _ \ _ (ql-(1-I')C) n A - Ae - k 
(iii) p* = Pe 
(iv) iJel(Ae, Pe) < p* :S iJeh(Ae, Pe) 
(V) ')'(p* - C) + (I-I')~<e·-c? ~ max {ql - C, (%2~c)2} 
By rearranging equations (i)-(iv), it is obtained that p* must lie in the interval: 
( _) = (,8(1 -,),)(qh(l -')') - ql)(k - (ql - (l-')')c)) E, P - k(l - ,8h2ql ' 
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(3(qh(1 - ')') - ql)(k - (ql - (1 - ')')c))) 
k(1 - (3)(1 - ')')q/ (13) 
Of course, since p* is the low quality seller's randomization probability, it has 
to lie in the interval (0,1). Taking this into account, we can show the following 
result on existence. The proof is again relegated to the appendix. 
Proposition 8 An advertising partial pooling equilibrium exists if and only if 
the following conditions (i ')- (iv') are satisfied: 
(i') qh > 2ql 
(ii') ')' < %q~ql 
( """'1 Q < k'Y2ql Zz?, / fJ - (1--Y)(Qh(1--Y)-Ql)(k-(ql-(1--y)c))+k-y2ql 
(iv'l k > (1--y)«%-c)2_(Ql-(1--y)c)2) / - 2-Y(Ql-(1--y)c) 
The intuition behind these conditions is similar to that in the advertising full 
pooling equilibrium. Consider first the low quality seller. Conditions (i')-(iii') 
ensure that he does not deviate. Note that conditions (i') and (ii') are the same as 
conditions (a') and (b') in proposition 7. In contrast, condition (iii') is different 
and requires that the consumers' prior probability of high quality is not too 
high. All these three conditions imply that the pooling price charged in a semi-
separating equilibrium is neither very low nor very high and that sales are not very 
low. If the price were very low, the low quality seller instead of randomizing would 
deterministically charge the optimal price under full information (condition (i')). 
On the other hand, if the pooling price were too high, then the low quality seller 
would deterministically charge the pooling price (condition (iii')). Condition (ii') 
assures that sales are not too low in a semi-separating equilibrium. As in a full 
pooling equilibrium, demand stems from those consumers who receive the wrong 
information. So, the noise in the market must be sufficiently high for a partial 
pooling equilibrium to exist. 
Consider now the high quality seller. Condition (i')-(iii') also assure that 
the high quality seller does not deviate by lowering his price. Condition (iv') 
is required in order to avoid that the high quality seller profitably deviates by 
raising its price and extensively distributing free samples. Condition (iv') also 
requires that the advertising costs must be sufficiently large. 
<insert Figure 5 here> 
The set of parameters for which a semi-separating equilibrium exists is non-
empty. In Figure 5, we have represented conditions (iii') and (iv') in the space 
k - {3. The rest of the parameters have been chosen to satisfy (i') and (ii'). 
Condition (iii') is depicted by the schedule C-C while condition (iv') is represented 
by the line D-D. The shaded area then represents the parameter space for which 
an advertising partial pooling equilibrium exists. The following remarks are in 
line: When {3 is small enough, then it is guaranteed that 0 < !!.. < 1. Observe 
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that as (3 decreases the set (E, p) shrinks. In the limiting case (3 = 0, there is no 
positive probability for which the low quality seller would be willing to randomize. 
Contrarily, as (3 increases, the set (e., p) is enlarged. In fact, when (3 approaches 
1, both E and p tend to infinity. This is the reason for which (3 cannot exceed the 
critical value 7J (obtained from (iii')) for an equilibrium to exist. 
As in the previous equilibria, each advertising partial pooling equilibrium 
survives the intuitive criterion. In fact, assume that (p*,).. *, p*) is an advertising 
partial pooling equilibrium. By definition, (p*,)..*, p*) is intuitive if there does not 
exist another price p for which (a) p - c > ,(qt!(l - ,) - c) + (ql - (1- ,)c)2/2k 
and (b) p < ql are satisfied. In other words, the set ,(ql(l - ,) - c) + (ql - (1 -
,)c)2/2k + c < p < ql must be empty. Condition (v) in proposition 7 guarantees 
that it is indeed so. 
In order to conclude the analysis we consider Figure 6. This Figure has 
been constructed from figures 4 and 5. The decreasing schedule in region Il is 
the schedule C-C in Figure 4 and the one in region III is the schedule C-C in 
Figure 5. The critical values fi and 7J are also extracted from those figures. For 
the parameter constellations covered by region I and Il, an advertising partial 
pooling equilibrium exists. Contrarily, an advertising full pooling equilibrium 
exists for those parameters in regions Il and Ill. 
The intuition is as follows: for (3 close to zero, there exists a partial pooling 
equilibrium. The low quality seller, in such an equilibrium, charges the pooling 
price with low probability. As (3 increases, the probability of charging the pooling 
price increases. Once (3 reaches the boundary of region I, also a full pooling 
equilibrium exists. So, in region Il, partial and full pooling equilibria coexist. 
However, the probability of charging the pooling price goes beyond one when (3 
reaches the bOlmdary of region Il. Then, a partial pooling equilibrium cannot 
exist in region Ill. 
<insert Figure 6 here> 
A final observation is that as , decreases, the region where there may coexist 
both partial and full pooling equilibria vanishes. The boundaries of both regions 
become equal in the limiting case of, = 0.5. 
6 Conclusions 
In this paper we have studied the decision of a producer to advertise a high quality 
product when he introduces the good into a market where consumers are unable 
to observe the quality of the product without first purchasing it. We have set up 
an adverse selection model where a monopolist introduces a product of uncertain 
quality. The product can be of either high or low quality. At the beginning of the 
trading period, only the producer observes the true quality while the consumers 
19 
receive an independent market signal which is correlated with the true quality of 
the good. Then the monopolist sets his price and advertising intensity. Those 
consumers receiving a free sample learn the true quality of the product while 
the rest of them update their quality beliefs taking into consideration the price 
observed, the signal received and the fact that they have not been reached by the 
advertising campaign. 
We have characterized the set of possible equilibria where informative adver-
tising occurs. Informative advertising never occurs in a separating equilibrium 
because prices convey full information about the quality and then advertising 
expenditures are then unnecessary. If informative advertising occurs there must 
exist some pooling. A full pooling equilibrium where informative advertising 
occurs can only exist when (a) the consumers' valuation for the high quality 
is sufficiently large, (b) the informativeness of the market signal is low enough, 
(c) the consumers' prior probability of high quality is sufficiently high and (d) 
the cost of advertising is high enough. Existence of advertising semi-separating 
equilibrium also requires (a), (b) and (d) but the consumers' prior probability of 
high quality must be low enough. We have also showed that when informative 
advertising appears in equilibrium, the adverse selection problem is mitigated. 
Moreover, the lower are advertising costs, the more intense is the alleviation of 
that problem. 
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7 Appendix 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 6: 
We use the following definitions and lemmas. Define: 
A = ,,8(1 -,) 
B = A(qh + c) + k(,,8 + (1 -,)(1 - ,8)) 
C = Aqhc + k(r,8qh + (1 -,)(1 - ,8)ql) 
X+ - B+(B2_4AC) ~ 
- 2A 
1 
X - - B-(B2_4AC)'l 
- 2A 
Lemma 5 B2 - 4AC > 0 
Proof. Rearranging terms, equation B2 - 4AC > 0 can be rewritten as al k2 + 
a2k+c> 0, whereal = (',8+(1-,)(1-,8))2, a2 = -2A(,,8(qh-C)-(1-,8)(1-
,)(qh -2ql+C)) and a3 = A2(qh -C)2. Consider the quadratic equation a1k2+a2k+ 
c = O. Since al > 0, it is a convex quadratic function whose solutions are given by 
k = (-a2±(a~-4ala3)o.5)/2al. It can easily be shown that a~-4ala3 < 0; in fact, 
a~ - 4ala3 = -(qh - qlb2(1-,)3,82(1- ,8) 2 (,,8(qh - c) + (1-,)(1- ,8)(ql - c)), 
which is clearly negative. Therefore, there is no real solution to the equation 
a1k2 + a2k + c = 0, which implies that a1k2 + a2k + c > o. The lemma then 
follows .• 
Lemma 6 X+ > qh. 
Proof. We show that B /2A > qh. Then, by using the previous one, the lemma 
directly follows. B /2A > qh as long as A(qh +c) + k(,,8 + (1-,)(1- ,8)) > 2Aqh. 
This inequality can be rewrite as k(r,8 + (1 - ,)(1 -,8)) > A(qh - c). Since 
A < ,,8+(1-,)(1-,8) and, by assumption, k > qh-cit follows that B/2A > qh .• 
L 7 /1 ( (1 )) 0 th ,B(ql-(l--y)qh)(ql-(l-J)c) emma ql - - , qh > , en ,B(ql-(l--Y)Qh)+(l-,B)(l--y)qz) < qh - C 
Proof. The left hand side of the inequality is an increasing function of the 
parameter ,8. Then, by showing that the inequality holds at worst (,8 = 1), the 
lemma is proved. For ,8 = 1, the inequality reduces to (ql - (1 -,)qh)(ql - (1 -
,)c) - (qh - C)(ql - (1 - ,)qh) < O. Rearranging terms, it can be rewritten as 
(ql - (1 - 'Y)qh)(ql - qh + 'Yc) < O. By using the assumption qh - C > ql and 
the hypothesis ql - (1 - ,)qh > 0, it is easily chechked that this inequality is 
satisfied .• 
The proof of the proposition 6 now follows: 
Proof. (::}) Assume that (p*,). *) is an advertising pooling equilibrium. Then, 
from proposition 5, it must satisfy equationp* ~ qeh().*(P*)). Solving this inequa-
lity for p*, it is obtained that the equilibrium price must satisfy either p* ~ X-
or p* 2: X+. Lemma 5 assures that X- and X+ are well defined. In addition, 
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lemma 6 allows us to ignore those prices p* 2: X+. From (b) and (c) in proposi-
tion 5 one has X- - p* 2: 0 and p* 2: qL/(l-')'). By adding these two inequalities, 
it follows that (1 - ,),)X- 2: ql. This inequality can be rewritten (a bit tedious) 
as: 
Assume that (a) does not hold, that is, qh - 2ql ::; O. Then, since,), > 0.5, one 
must have')' 2: (qh - ql)/qh, that is, qh(l -')') - ql ::; O. Otherwise, there would 
not exist any feasible ')'. Then, both sides of the inequality (14) are negative. 
Rewriting this inequality, it requires that 
(15) 
However, lemma 7 shows that 
(16) 
which, since k > qh - c, constitutes a contradiction. As a result, (a) must be 
satisfied and, since,), > 0.5, (b) must also hold. Condition (c) is nothing else 
than equation (14) properly rearranged. 
Finally, by condition (d) in proposition 5, one has that ')'(p* - c) + (1 -
,),)2(p* _ C)2 j2k 2: (qh - c)2 j2k. Since the left hand side of this inequality is 
strictly increasing in p* and p* ::; X-, (d') follows. 
(~) We show that, if (a')-(d') are satisfied, then (p,A) = (X-, (l-')')(X--
c)jk) is an advertising pooling equilibrium. First, the optimal advertising inten-
sity follows from substituting X- into the optimal advertising function given by 
the lemma 1. Condition (b') ensures that the low quality seller does not deviate. 
On the other hand, condition (d') assures that the high quality seller does not 
deviate by using the strategy (p,~) = (qh, (qh - c)/k). To complete the proof, 
we have to show that the high quality seller does not deviate by using the alter-
native strategy (p,~) = (q/, 0). Profits from using such a strategy are equal to 
ql - c. From condition (b'), one has that ,),(X- - c) 2: ')'(qL/(l - ')') - c). Since 
')' > 0.5, it follows that ql - c < ')'(qL/(l - ')') - c) ::; ,),(X- - c). Therefore, 
,),(X- - c) - (ql - c) + (1-')')2(X- - c)2/2k 2: 0; thus, the proposition follows .• 
PROOF OF PROPOSITION 8: 
Proof. (~) Assume that (p*, A *, p*) is an advertising partial pooling equilibrium. 
Then, by the hypothesis, it must satisfy p* = qL/(l-,),), A* = Ae = (ql-(l-')')c)/k, 
p* = Pe and qel(Ae, Pe) < p* ::; qeh(Ae, Pe). Combining these equations, it is 
obtained that p* must lie in the interval 
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f3(qh(l - ')') - qd(k - (ql - (1 - ')')c))) 
, k(l - (3)(1 - ')')ql . (17) 
Note here that since p* has to be a positive number, it has to be satisfied that 
')' < (qh - ql)/qh. Again, since,), > 0.5, for existence of advertising partial pooling 
equilibrium it i3 "...lecessary that qh > 2ql. Further, one needs that the intersection 
between the set (E., p) and (0,1) is nonempty; indeed (iii') follows from rearranging 
the inequality p < 1. Finally, by hypothesis, it must be true that ')'(qd(l - ')') -
c) + (ql - (1 _")-)C)2 /2k ~ (qh - c)2/2k. By isolating k, (iv') follows. 
(~) We show that if (i')-(iv') are satisfied, then 
( >. ) = (_q_l (ql - (1 - ')')c) p, , P 1 - ')" k ' 
f3(1 - ')')(qh(l - ')') - ql)(k - (ql - (1- ')')C))) 
, k(l - (3)')'2ql 
constitutes an advertising partial pooling equilibrium price. First, the advertising 
intensity is optimal given p and p (see lemma 1). Second, (i')-(iii') guarantee that 
the low quality seller is willing to randomize with a positive but smaller than one 
probability. Condition (ivJ assures that the high quality seller does not deviate 
by using the strategy (if, >.) = (qh, (qh - c)/k). To complete the proof, we have 
to show that the high quality seller does not deviate by using the alternative 
strategy (if, X) = (ql, 0). In other words, it must be true that ')'(qd(1- ')') - c) + 
(ql - (1 - ')')c)2 /2k ~ ql - c. This inequality is satisfied since,), > 0.5. (in fact, it 
is the case that ')'(qd(l - ')') - c) > ql - c) .• 
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Figure 1: Sellers demands when they are believed to 
produce the high quality with probability p. 
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Figure 2: Seller's demands when they are believed to 
produce the low quality with probability one. 
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